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Abstract
We develop a theory of endogenous political entrenchment in a simple two-party dy-
namic model of income redistribution with probabilistic voting. A partially self-interested
left-wing party may implement (entrenchment) policies reducing the income of its own
constituency, the lower class, in order to consolidate its future political power. Such poli-
cies increase the net gain that low-skill agents obtain from income redistribution, which
only the Left (but not the Right) can credibly commit to provide, and therefore may help
o¤setting a potential future aggregate ideological shock averse to the left-wing party. We
demonstrate that political entrenchment by the Left occurs only if incumbency rents are
su¢ ciently high and that low-skill citizens may vote for this party even though they ratio-
nally expect the adoption of these policies. We also discuss the case where the left-wing
party may have the incentive to ex-ante commit to not pursue entrenchment policies once
in power. Finally, we show that, in a more general framework, the entrenchment policies
can be implemented also by the right-wing party. The comparative statics analyzes the
e¤ects of state capacity, a positive bias of voters for one party and income inequality on
the incentives of the incumbent party to pursue entrenchment policies. The importance of
our theory for constitutionally legislated term limits is also discussed. The theory sheds
light on why left-wing parties or politicians often support liberal immigration policies of
unskilled workers, are sometime in favor of free trade with less developed economies and
of globalization more generally, or fail to reform plainly dysfunctionalpublic educational
systems damaging the lower classes.
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1 Introduction
There is now a large literature in political economy explaining why governments in a variety of
institutional environments relatively often pursue policies reducing the welfare of the society.1
A common feature of some of these models is that socially e¢ cient policies involve a potential
reallocation of political power from one social group, in power in the status quo, to another.
Therefore, in absence of commitment, partisan politicians, i.e. representing a particular social
constituency, may prefer to implement policies harmful to the society at large in order to pre-
vent an adversary group from gaining power. This type of explanation of why socially harmful
policies exist and are relatively pervasive is quite compelling and has a wide scope. Neverthe-
less, it does not explain (the more intriguing puzzle of) why occasionally incumbent politicians
appear to pursue policies that are harmful not only for the society as a whole, but also and
especially for their own constituency. Examples of policies with this apparently paradoxical
feature (discussed in greater detail in the following Section) include the liberal immigration
policies supported by left-wing parties in Europe and in the US, and the dysfunctional edu-
cational policies implemented by a number of Latin American populist governments. The
support of NAFTA by the Clinton Administration in the early 1990s or the reluctance of
many left-wing Latin American governments in the late 1990s and in the 2000s to abandon
the pro-globalization policies implemented by their right-wing predecessors are also potentially
puzzling. These policies are not necessarily ine¢ cient but still damage the economic interests
of a relatively signicant part of the constituency of the governments implementing them.
Why, and under what conditions, is it the case that once in o¢ ce politicians implement
policies that are not benecial for the very same people who brought them in power? In this
paper, we propose a simple dynamic (two-periods) model addressing this question.
In our framework, individuals have both preferences over an economic issue, which is af-
fected by policy (i.e., income redistribution), and over an exogenous noneconomic or ideological
issue, as in the spirit of probabilistic voting models à la Lindbeck and Weibull (1987) or Dixit
and Londregan (1995, 1998). Therefore, each citizen has a specic taste for which party is
in power and the distribution of this taste is subject to aggregate shocks, which generates
1Examples of such policies include the blocking of technological progress (e.g., Krusell and Rios-Rull, 1996)
and failing to make cost-e¤ective investments in human capital (e.g., Besley and Coate, 1998), subsidizing
declining industries (e.g., Dixit and Londregan, 1995, 1998; Brainard and Verdier, 1997; Coate and Morris,
1999; Acemoglu and Robinson, 2001). Other examples include investing in ine¢ cient state institutions with
limited capacity to tax or coerce citizens (Acemoglu, Ticchi and Vindigni, 2010a, 2011; Besley and Persson,
2009), protecting unproductive jobs with high ring costs (Saint-Paul, 1993, 2002), creating ine¢ cient social
infrastructures (Coate and Morris, 1995; Robinson and Torvik, 2005), or underpricing the shares of privatized
companies (Biais and Perotti, 2002).
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uncertainty on the outcome of the electoral competition.
We assume that there are only two income classes, the low-skill (or the poor) and the
high-skill (or the rich), and two political parties which compete in majoritarian (i.e., winner-
takes-all) elections. Each party cares about the welfare of one of the two social groups as in
the spirit of partisan models of political economy (e.g., Alesina, 1988; Osborne and Slivinsky,
1996; Besley and Coate, 1997), but also derives rents from being in power, as in the spirit of
the classic Downsian model of political competition. As in models of partisan politics, parties
cannot ex-ante commit to implement a policy di¤erent from their preferred one once in o¢ ce.
We will call the Left and the Right the party that cares about the welfare of the poor and the
rich respectively.
There are two periods and, in each period, the party in o¢ ce chooses the degree of income
redistribution. Moreover, and this is the main innovation of the model, we assume that the
second period pre-tax income of the low-skill agents can be set at a level lower than the potential
one by the government in o¢ ce in the rst period. This policy has two main features: it is
straightforwardly Pareto-ine¢ cient and it increases income inequality by reducing the income
of the poor in absolute terms as well as relative to the mean income. Nevertheless, we show
that, under some conditions, the left-wing party may nd it optimal implementing such a
policy that damages the members of its own natural constituency.
The rationale for the adoption of this policy is that by reducing the income of the low-skill
individuals, income inequality increases and income redistribution becomes more valuable for
the poor, so that they will have a higher incentive to vote for the left-wing party. In other words,
partisan politicians cannot commit on which redistributive policies will be undertaken once they
are in o¢ ce, and only the Left, given its partisan preferences, promotes income redistribution
policies. In other words, if the Right could commit to implement enough redistribution in
advance, the damaging policy would not be implemented by the Left.
Hence, the Left, if in power in the rst period, may nd it optimal implementing policies
that will make the poor more dependenton income redistribution in the future, so that the
economic incentives of the poor to vote for this party increase. In our model, there are aggregate
preference shocks for the identity of the party in power. Given the distribution of those shocks,
the Left is more likely to win the election, the more the poor have a genuine economic benet
from its policies. This benet is in turn stronger, the poorer the poor relative to the rich. We
will refer to a policy with that e¤ect as entrenchment because its implementation allows the
party to tie its own natural constituency more to itself.
A number of features of our model are worth emphasizing. First, the existence of an
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equilibrium with potential entrenchment does not rely on any form of myopia or irrationality
on either side of the political arena. In fact, it may be rational for the poor to vote for the
Left in the rst period even though the policy of entrenchment (which becomes e¤ective in the
second period) is correctly anticipated. This is because in the rst period the Left, unlike the
Right, provides some redistribution of income which might more than compensate the poor
for their future income losses generated by the entrenchment policy.2 Second, our argument
generalizes naturally to any policy that increases income inequality regardless of the sign of its
impact on the income of each group. We focus on the case where the poors pre-tax income is
reduced and the richs is unchanged because we want our model to be able to shed light on why
governments may pursue ine¢ cient policies that harm their own constituencies.3 Third, even
though we present a model where only the left-wing party implements entrenchment policies,
we are by no means arguing that entrenchment is a policy exclusive of Left. In fact, we also
propose an extension of our baseline model where the entrenchment strategy may be optimal
for the Right. Moreover, the concept of political entrenchment is more general and can be
applied to di¤erent frameworks, such as the provision of other public goods. For example, if
we consider the case of national defence and assume that this gives a relatively higher utility
to the natural constituency of the right-wing party and that such a party has an advantage
in providing it, then it is possible that the Right pursues entrenchment strategies through an
unnecessarily aggressive foreign policy.
The comparative static analysis shows that political entrenchment is more likely to occur
when the rents appropriated by the party in power are higher, which suggests that we should
expect more entrenchment in political systems with relatively limited checks and balances.4
The e¤ect of a positive bias in favor of the Left, a higher income inequality and a higher level
of state capacity have in general an ambiguous e¤ect on entrenchment. However, under some
conditions on the distribution of the ideological taste shock or when state capacity is low, we
show that a higher level of state capacity increases the incentive of the Left to implement
entrenchment strategies. Since a low level of state capacity is characteristic of developing
economies, this result also suggests that an autonomous increase in state capacity is particularly
likely to have harmful consequences for developing countries.
2Furthermore, in the second period, the poors post-redistribution income may still be higher than if the
right were in power, despite a lower pre-redistribution income.
3While in our model entrenchment is associated with pro-active policies that reduce the relative position of
the Lefts constituency, it may also result in failure to implement policies that improve this relative position.
4This could be the case in many Latin American countries whose institutions feature a form of presiden-
tial government with limited separation of powers with the legislature and the judiciary (see, for example,
Mainwaring and Shugart, 1997, and Stokes, 2009).
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We also show that, under some conditions such as the presence of a limited state scal
capacity, the left-wing party may have an incentive to ex-ante commit not to pursue entrench-
ment policies once in power. In fact, entrenchment policies increase the probability of the
Lefts winning future elections, but they reduce the welfare of the citizens from having this
party in power and, therefore, its probability of winning current elections.
Our theory also provides a rationale for constitutionally prescribed term limits. In fact,
term limits may reduce the adoption of entrenchment policies since they lower the value of
capturing power in the future for the incumbent leader. This result is important not only in
its own right, but also because it helps explaining why many real world constitutions prescribe
some form of term limits in spite of the fact that a key prediction of the standard model
of political replacement is that term limits are always welfare reducing (e.g., Barro, 1973;
Ferejohn, 1986; Persson, Roland and Tabellini, 1997).5
This paper is related to the literature on the strategic theory of budget decits where an
incumbent partisan leader may strategically use public debt in order to manipulate the future
spending policy or the future allocation of political power (e.g., Persson and Svensson, 1989;
Aghion and Bolton, 1990; Alesina and Tabellini, 1990; Tabellini and Alesina, 1990). In a
similar spirit, Milesi-Ferretti and Spolaore (1994) and Milesi-Ferretti (1995) demonstrate that
incumbent leaders may choose to strategically manipulate some macroeconomic state variables,
such as exchange rates or the composition of government spending, in order to increase their
future electoral comparative advantage. None of these papers, however, addresses the issue
of why partially self-interested governments may deliberately pursue policies harmful for their
own natural constituency.
A literature in economics (e.g., Harrington, 1993) and in political science (e.g., Stokes,
2001) has addressed the question of why occasionally elected politicians deviate from their
electoral promises, creating a discrepancy between mandates and actual policies.6 According
to these authors, once in o¢ ce (benevolent) politicians may deviate from their original elec-
toral promises if they believe that such policies do not serve best the interest of their own
constituency. Therefore, violations of mandates are actually made in the interest of some po-
litical constituencies, and are not necessarily punished ex-post by rational voters. It is worth
5This is because in such models, repeated elections are su¢ cient to provide incentives to politicians in power
to refrain from appropriating too much rents. Term limits represent a harmful self-imposed constraint since
they force voters to replace politicians even if the latter have behaved well in o¢ ce. As a result, elections prove
to be less valuable as a discipline device in presence of term limits.
6A prominent example is the introduction and consolidation of a vast array of neoliberal policies in many
Latin American countries in the last few decades of the previous century, which stood in contrast to the electoral
promises made by successful politicians to their constituency (see Stokes, 2001, for a broad discussion on this
point).
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emphasizing that our paper asks a rather di¤erent question, namely why self-interested politi-
cians hurt their natural constituencies and yet the latter vote (and reappoint) them in o¢ ce
despite anticipating correctly the equilibrium strategy of politicians.
Our notion of political entrenchment, which is the source of persistence of power in our
model, has some similarity with the concept of managerial entrenchment in the theory of
corporate nance (e.g., Weisbach, 1988; Shleifer and Vishny, 1989). In this literature, managers
may entrench themselves by making manager-specic investments because this reduces the
probability of being replaced by raising the cost of such action for the rm and allows them to
earn higher wages. Similarly, in our model, political entrenchment makes it more costly for the
lower class to vote for the Right, and therefore allows incumbent leftists politicians or parties
to appropriate of higher intertemporal o¢ ce rents by consolidating their power.
Within the large literature on ine¢ cient policies (briey cited in Footnote 1), our paper is
most closely related to the paper of Besley and Coate (1998) and Padró-i-Miguel (2007). In the
former paper, a leader representing the perfect agent of a specic social constituency, the low-
skill workers with low-ability, may decide not to implement a cost-e¢ cient policy like investing
in education, in order to preserve the power of its own constituency. In fact, this would lead to
the emergence of an anti-redistribution majority in the future if the low-skill workers with high-
ability, whose skills and income are potentially increased by investment in human capital, were
educated. In our paper instead, the left-wing party implements an ine¢ cient policy (which is
very similar to not upgrading the skills of the poor) for self-interest motivation and against the
preferences of its constituency. This result highlights the importance of our assumption that
political agency is not perfect contrary to what is assumed in Besley and Coates paper. In
Padró-i-Miguels paper the leaders of competing ethnic groups, once in power, exploit not only
the adversary groups but also in part their own group. This is possible because the members
of this group fear that the replacement of the incumbent leader may bring to power the leader
of the competing group, who would exploit them even more. However, in Padró-i-Miguels
paper the leader in o¢ ce does not deliberately reduce the productivity of its own constituency
to consolidate its own future power by manipulating a state variable of the dynamic political
game, which is the key novel idea of our paper.
The paper also relates to the dynamic models of income redistribution, such as Saint-Paul
and Verdier (1997), Bénabou (2000, 2002) and Hassler et al. (2003), where, unlike in the
classic static models of Romer (1975) and Meltzer and Richards (1981), income inequality
is an endogenous state variable and voting over scal policy is forward-looking. Finally, our
paper is closely related to the recent work on the persistence of political power and political
5
institutions (e.g., Acemoglu and Robinson, 2008; Acemoglu et al., 2010b, 2011); yet, the origin
of political persistence in our paper is rather di¤erent from any of these works.
The rest of the paper is organized as follows. Section 2 presents some evidence for our
theory. Section 3 describes the framework. Section 4 characterizes the equilibrium. Section
5 presents the comparative statics analysis. Section 6 discusses under what conditions the
Left may want to limit the possibility of pursuing entrenchment policies in the future, while
Section 7 proposes an extension of our framework where also the Right may nd it optimal
implementing policies of entrenchment. Section 8 discusses the importance of our theory for
term limits. Section 9 concludes and the Appendix contains some proofs omitted from the
main text.
2 Some Evidence
This Section illustrates briey some examples of policies that are harmful to the constituency
of the government implementing them.
1. Immigration policies in Western Europe and in the US
After World War I, laws were passed severely limiting immigration. Only a trickle of
immigrants has been admitted since then... By keeping labor supply down, immigration policy
tends to keep wages high.Paul Samuelson (quoted in Borjas, 2003, p. 1335).
We next present some evidence on the pattern of immigration laws passed in recent years
by the European Union (EU) and in the US through the 20th century consistent with the main
prediction of our theory.
Migration and immigrant integration policies in Europe are increasingly determined at the
EU level. EU rules now cover the full gamut of migration policies,from entry, residence, and
economic rights of immigrants to societal integration of immigrants and their descendents; in
addition, the European Parliament has signicant amendment and veto powers in the adoption
of these policies.
On the basis of standard labor demand theory (e.g., Hamermesh, 1993), it is reasonable to
expect that, to the extent that immigrants are disproportionately unskilled, unskilled and un-
employed workers are more likely to be opposed to immigration than more highly skilled work-
ers or capital owners, since they are more likely to be in competition for jobs with immigrants
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than with higher-skilled workers.7 Consistently with this expectation, Scheve and Slaughter
(2001) nd robust evidence that in the US less skilled workers prefer anti-immigration policies;
Mayda (2006) nds similar results in a cross-section of countries.8 Therefore, one should also
expect that left-wing parties support conservative migration policies, in line with the economic
interests of a large share of their voters, who often compete with immigrants for unskilled jobs.
In a recent empirical study, Hix and Noury (2007) address the question of which interests
EU politicians promote when making migration policies, by looking at the passage of six pieces
of migration related legislation in the fth directly elected European Parliament (19992004).
In reporting the results of their empirical analysis Hix and Noury (2007, p. 184) write that,
We nd that the strongest determinants of behavior in the European Parliament on migration
and related issues are the general left-right ideological positions of the European parliamentari-
ans and the transnational European parties. These are stronger predictors of political behavior
in the European Parliament on these issues than the economic preferences of the European
parliamentarians constituents, or the economic interests or political preferences of the EU
member states. In other words, left-wing politicians support liberal migration policies, despite
the economic interests of many of their voters, who often compete with immigrants for un-
skilled jobs. Meanwhile, right-wing politicians support restrictive migration policies, despite
the economic interests of many of their supporters, who benet from increasing returns on
capital investment which results from greater immigration.
Given that European parliamentary elections are based on a proportional system, we expect
Euro-MPs to face relatively little personal accountability for deviating from their constituen-
ciespreferences;9 in such a context rents from being in o¢ ce are likely to be more inuential
than the constituentswell-being. Our model predicts that this is when entrenchment is most
likely to arise, and this is in line with the above evidence on the MEPs voting pattern on
migration.10
7The empirical evidence on the e¤ects of immigration of unskilled workers on the labor market outcomes of
their native peers is mixed. Some papers (e.g., LaLonde and Topel, 1991; Card, 2001), based on the computation
of the spatial correlation between native wages and the extent of the penetration of immigrants in local labor
markets, indicate that immigrants have little or no e¤ect on the employment opportunities of competing native
workers. Borjas (2003) argues instead that such spatial correlation does not necessarily uncover a causal e¤ect
for several reasons; immigrants may not be randomly assigned to labor markets and natives may respond to
immigration by moving elsewhere. Borjas provides alternative evidence which is supportive of the standard
textbook view summarized by the quotation of Paul Samuelson reported at the beginning of this Section (see
also Borjas and Aydemir, 2007, 2011).
8 It is worth emphasizing that, for our theory, it is more important what the unskilled workers believe about
the e¤ects of immigration on their wages and welfare rather than its real e¤ects on them.
9See for example Persson and Tabellini (2000).
10 In our model, parties partly internalize the welfare of their constituents. This is because the politicians are
(partly) citizen-candidateswho belong to the same social class as their constituents. In practice, one observes
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Some evidence broadly consistent with our main proposition that left-leaning political par-
ties are inclined to support liberal immigration policies potentially harmful to (at least part of)
their natural constituency, is also provided by the history of immigration laws in the United
States through the 20th century. In particular, several examples of legislative reforms clearly
document that the Republican Party has been generally in favor of restricting immigration,
whereas the Democratic Party has often assumed the opposite stance on this issue.
The immigration policy in the US became more restrictive in the second decades of the 20th
century with Immigration Act of 1924, or JohnsonReed Act, including the National Origins
Act, and Asian Exclusion Act, passed by the 68th Congress.11 This new legislation limited the
annual number of immigrants who could be admitted from any country to 2% of the number
of people from that country who were already living in the US in 1890, down from the 3% cap
set by the Immigration Restriction Act of 1921, according to the Census of 1890. Congressman
Albert Johnson and Senator David Reed, both Republicans, were the two main architects of
the reform, and both the House of Representatives and the Senate had a Republican majority.12
The Immigration Act of 1965, also known as the Hart-Celler Act, fundamentally reshaped
the American immigration policy for the remainder of the twentieth century and beyond. It
abolished the national origins system, set up in the Immigration Act of 1924 and modied by
the Immigration Act of 1952. While seeming to maintain the principle of numerical restriction,
it so increased the categories of persons who could enter without numerical limitation as
to make its putative numerical caps 170,000 annually for the Eastern Hemisphere with a
maximum of 20,000 per nation plus 120,000 annually for the Western Hemisphere with no
national limitations virtually meaningless within a few years.
By changing long-held immigration policies, the act resulted in new immigration from non-
European nations which changed the ethnic make-up of the US. Immigration doubled between
1965 and 1970, and doubled again between 1970 and 1990. The most dramatic e¤ect was to
shift immigration from Europe to Asia and Central and South America.
Although the percentage of high school dropouts among immigrants has fallen somewhat,
that some politicians on the Left comes from the upper-middle class. In this case, it is not as persons that
they internalize their constituentswelfare. Rather, this component of their utility is best viewed as a metaphor
for their individual strategies in a context where they have to maintain a reputation with their voters. Again,
given the proportional system and the aloofness of the European Parliament to most voters, we expect such
an internalization to be weaker there. While this means that o¢ ce rents play a bigger role, it may also imply
that the politiciansown personal tastes a¤ect their voting behavior. This latter mechanism is absent from our
model however.
11A detailed historical analysis of the US immigration politicies can be found, for example, in Zolberg (2008).
12There were only nine dissenting votes in the Senate and a handful of opponents in the House, the most
vigorous of whom was the Brooklyn Democrat Representative Emanuel Celler.
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the gap between natives and the foreign born has grown signicantly, with immigrants more
than twice as likely as native-born Americans not to have completed high school. This con-
tributes to a growing pool of blue-collar workers competing for a shrinking number of well-
paying jobs.
Finally, the One Hundred First United States Congress, in which both chambers had a
Democratic majority, passed in 1990 the Immigration Act of 1990 increased the number of legal
immigrants allowed into the United States each year. The law also provided for exceptions to
the English testing process required for naturalization set forth by the Naturalization Act of
1906. After it became law, the United States would admit 700,000 new immigrants annually,
up from 500,000 before the bills passage.
2. The North American Free Trade Agreement
Another example where political entrenchment may have played a role is the passing of
the North American Free Trade Agreement (NAFTA) by the democratic-controlled Congress
in 1992 with the support of President Clinton. While free trade has positive aggregate gains,
the Stolper-Samuelson theorem implies that the low skilled workers in the US will lose, while
the high-skilled workers will gain. Therefore, it is surprising that the agreement was signed by
a Democratic administration, which may be expected to give a relatively high political voice
to the lower classes. In fact, the union movement, which we may interpret as representing
the welfare of the incumbent, median, low-skilled workers, and which clearly derives less rents
from Democratic politicians being in o¢ ce than the politicians themselves, strongly opposed
NAFTA. Our model suggests that one of the possible reasons why the Democratic adminis-
tration went ahead with NAFTA is that, by widening the earnings gap between skilled and
unskilled, it would increase future political support for the redistributive programs that are
traditionally implemented by the Democratic party. While this is arguably not the only reason
(a substantial fraction of Democratic voters are rich and benet from NAFTA), it may have
nonetheless contributed to the overall outcome.
Some interesting features are worth noting. First, the Republicans supported the agreement
more than the Democrats, and they are the ones who initiated it; in fact, if only democratic
congressmen had voted it, it would not have passed.13 Does that contradict our model?
Not necessarily, to the extent that the policy generates aggregate gains, it is possible for the
Republicans to benet from it too, since the direct economic gains accrue to the upper class,
13Accounts on the determinants of congressional voting on NAFTA di¤er. But both Kang and Greene (1999)
and Kahane (1996) nd that these determinants obey a conventional logic, in that congressional districts with
a greater proportion of potential losers were more likely to oppose the bill.
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even though their reelection probability su¤ers. Second, it may well be that the President
is more prone to entrenchment than representatives. In our model, entrenchment is more
likely to arise, the greater is state capacity, i.e. the greater the amount of money that the
government can redistribute. Since the US (as opposed to Europe) is characterized by low
party discipline, each individual congressman is accountable to his or her constituency, and
has little ability to implement a redistributive programme at the congressional district level.
Hence state capacity is low for congressmen, while it is larger for the President, implying
that the latter may be more prone to entrenchment than the former.14
3. Educational policies in Latin America
In a recent book, Edwards (2010) argues that dysfunctional educational policies character-
istic of many Latin American countries have a premier role in explaining both the persistence of
underdevelopment and of income inequality in that continent.15 Edwards (p. 179) writes that,
But without any doubt the most important cause of Latin Americas social ills including
poverty and income inequality is the historical dreadful state of the regions educational sys-
tem. By neglecting education the vast majority of the Latin American countries have failed
to upgrade their labor force skills and have lagged behind other nations in the key areas of
human capital formation and productivity growth. It is not an exaggeration to say that work-
ers in many Latin American countries are among the least prepared to meet the high skill
requirements of the twenty-rst century.
While the quality of the educational systems in most Latin American countries has been
historically very low, it is interesting to remark that, according to Edwards (p. 181), the
e¤orts occasionally made to reform and modernize the educational system have been strongly,
and successfully, opposed by teachersunions and left-of-center political parties, the natural
political references of the main potential beneciary of such reforms.
Examples of failed educational reforms include the e¤ort undertook by the Argentinian
minister Juan Llach to improve the quality of the school system and the ability of Argentina to
compete more e¤ectively in a global economy. Llachs program, while ingenious and ambitious,
was not ultimately implemented due to the opposition of the powerful teachers union, of the
Peronist opposition party and especially of President Fernando de la Rúas own party, the
14 It is interesting to observe that Barack Obama himself initially took a negative stance over NAFTA, linking
it to lost jobs in the United States more than once during the electoral campaign of 20072008. However,
once in o¢ ce, Obama appeared to change his mind rather quickly. In his rst foreign trip as President, Obama
announced, in the presence of Canadian Prime Minister Stephen Harper, I want to grow trade and not contract
it(quoted in Stokes, 2009, p. 26).
15See also on this topic the classic contribution of Dornbusch and Edwards (1992), which focuses on the harmful
consequences of the populistmacroeconomic policies widely implemented by Latin American governments.
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Union Civica Radical, an old and traditional center-left political party. Not surprisingly, the
quality of education in Argentina has gradually deteriorated. While there is a considerable
variation across provinces, with the rich areas doing relatively well, the educational system
in the poorer regions of the country lays in disarray, performing no better than the most
destitute countries of the world(Edwards, 2010, p. 182).
Many other educational reforms promoted by left-wing or populistLatin American lead-
ers and aimed at improving the skills and human capital of the lower classes had a similar
dismal outcome.16 For example, the government of Hugo Chávez in Venezuela launched a
variety of ambitious projects aimed, in principle, at improving education at various levels.17
Many observers have criticized all such programs as ine¤ective and fraught with corruption
however. Indeed, despite massive investments, illiteracy barely declined during the Chávez
presidency.
Other types of policies implemented by Chávezs government with the goal of reorienting
state priorities to benet the poor, have also appeared to harm rather than to improve the social
conditions of some segments of the constituency of the leader. For example, Hsieh, Ortega,
Miguel, and Rodrigúez (2011) have demonstrated using a large dataset with information on
political opinion of voters that many of the original supporters of Chávez experienced a 4%
decline in personal income after the referendum. Overall, despite the original promises, after
twelve year of Chávezs presidency the economic performance of the lower classes has stagnated
at best, but more likely has even declined.18
All of these examples naturally raise the question of why the masses in Latin America have
been so much inclined to support populist parties and leaders. Our theory suggests that they
probably had little alternative to the policy choice of populist redistribution appealing for the
Left.
16Examples include the educational reforms attempted by Evo Morales in Bolivia, or by Daniel Ortega in
Nicaragua, aimed at improving the coverage of education at promoting literacy campaigns (Edwards, 2000, p.
181).
17These reforms included a literacy campaign (the Misión Robinson), a program aimed at improving quality
and coverage of public education (the Misión Robinson II), a program dealing with high-school students and
dropouts (the Misión Ribas), and nally a program aimed at reforming higher education (the Misión Sucre).
18Using o¢ cial statistics Francisco Rodrigúez has argued in an article in Foreign A¤airs (March/April 2008)
that, Most health and human development indicators have shown no signicant improvement beyond that
which is normal in the midst of an oil boom. Indeed, some have deteriorated worryingly, and o¢ cial estimates
indicate that income inequality has increased. The Chávez is good for the poorhypothesis is inconsistent with
the facts.
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3 The Model
We consider an economy populated by a continuum of measure one of citizens, and by two
partially selsh political parties. There are two periods of time, t 2 f0; 1g, and citizen i has
preferences represented by the following expected utility function
ui0 = E0
1X
t=0
tuit;
where uit is the per period utility function of agent i, E0 is the expected value operator con-
ditional on the information available at date t = 0, and  2 (0; 1) is the discount factor. The
function uit is assumed to be linear in private good consumption, equal to post-tax income,
in the level of the public good provided Gt, nanced through proportional taxation at rate  ,
and in an ideological component it reecting specic preferences for which political party is in
power (that will be described more precisely below). The instantaneous utility can therefore
be written as
uit = (1   t) ait +Gt + it; (1)
where ait denotes the income of agent i at time t.
We assume that citizens also di¤er in terms of their productivity and pre-tax income,
and that a mass  2 (0; 1=2) are high-skill or rich with pre-tax income equal to ar, while
the remaining fraction of agents 1    are low-skill or poor with pre-tax income equal to
ap(t) = ta
p, where 0 < ap < ar.19 The productivity of high-skill agents is assumed to be
constant over time, whereas the productivity of the low-skilled is potentially time-varying and
depends on an endogenous state variable t 2

L; 1

, where 0  L  1.20 The initial value
of ; 0 > L; is exogenously given, while the value of 1 is chosen by the government in o¢ ce
at period t = 0 at zero cost, so that potential output is always maximized by setting 1 = 1,
while any 1 < 1 represents an ine¢ cient policy choice. Also note that lower levels of 1 imply
a poorer and a more unequal society since only the unskilled workers experience a productivity
loss. The aggregate and average income at time t is equal to
at(t)  ar + (1  ) tap;
19We are assuming that the poor are more numerous than the rich, which in this simple two-groups model
reproduces the skewness of the empirical income distributions usually observed.
20As it will be clear, the lower bound L will not play any special role in our analysis and results are unchanged
when L = 0. The existence of a lower bound to the income of the poor will allow us to analyze under what
conditions the possibility of entrenchment is ex-ante desirable for the left-wing party and when it is not (see on
this point the analysis in Section 6).
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and the government budget constraint reads
Gt   tat(t)   t [ar + (1  ) tap] : (2)
To simplify the analysis, we assume that taxes create no distortions for all   ^ , where ^ 2
(0; 1) is an exogenous level of scal capacityof the state, while distortions are prohibitively
high for  > ^ .
The political process is based on a simple dynamic version of the standard probabilistic
voting model of Lindbeck and Weibull (1987) and Dixit and Londregan (1995, 1998), where
the outcome of elections is potentially e¤ected by exogenous ideological shocks.
There are two parties, J 2 fP;Rg, where P denotes the Left party and R the Right party.
The preferences of party J can be written as
vJ0 = E0
1X
t=0
tvJt ;
with
vPt = (1   t) apt +Gt + t; (3)
and
vRt = (1   t) art +Gt + t; (4)
where t represents the private benet from being in power. We assume that t =  > 0 if
the party is in power, and t = 0 if it is not. Expressions (3) and (4) reect the assumption
that political parties are partially benevolent, i.e., they care about the economic utility of
one specic social class (the Left party cares of the poor and the Right of the rich), and
partially self-interested, as they care about the rents from being in o¢ ce.21 As in the spirit
of the partisan models of politics (e.g., Alesina, 1988), we assume that parties cannot commit
to implement a policy di¤erent from their own ideal one and that individuals vote sincerely,
which is a weakly dominant strategy in a two-parties system (e.g., Grossman and Helpman,
2001). We denote with 'it 2 fP;Rg the voting decision of citizen i at time t, and the identity
of the government in o¢ ce at time t will be denoted by t 2 fP;Rg.
The ideological component it in the per period utility of the citizens (1) can be represented
as follows
it =

"it + t, if t = P
0, if t = R:
(5)
21A possible microfoundation of this assumption is that politicians are citizen-candidates as in the models of
Osborne and Slivinsky (1996) and Besley and Coate (1997), and therefore care about the policy implemented.
However, politicians also care to some extent about being in power per se because this allows them to appropriate
some rents from o¢ ce (either due to political institutions or psychological factors, such as ego rents). See
Grossman and Helpman (2001) for a discussion of citizen-candidate models.
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The rst term on the right hand side of (5) decomposes the overall ideological bias of citizen i
in favor of party P at time t, it, in two components, "
i
t and t, while the bias is normalized to
zero when the Right is in power.22
In particular, we assume that " represents an idiosyncratic ideological shock that varies
both across agents and across time, and whose realizations are i.i.d. over time for each agent
and drawn from a continuous distribution function F (") with smooth (i.e., di¤erentiable with
continuity) density f (")  F 0 (") and zero mean. A positive value of "i reects an idiosyncratic
bias of agent i in favor of party P , whereas a negative value of "i reects a bias of agent i
against it. We assume that the density function f (") has the following properties.
Assumption 1 f (x) = f ( x).
Assumption 2 xf 0 (x)  0.
Assumptions 1 and 2 imply that the density function of the idiosyncratic ideological shock
" is symmetric around its mean and hump-shaped.
The random variable t represents an aggregate ideological shock that is equal for all agents
at each point in time and it is assumed to be i.i.d. over time. The realizations of t are drawn
from a continuous distribution function  (), with smooth density  ()  0 () and zero
mean. A positive value of t reects the existence of an aggregate bias in favor of party P at
time t, whereas a negative value of t represents an aggregate bias against such party. While
the computation of the political equilibrium does not require any distributional restriction on
 (), in the comparative static analysis we will assume that  () is hump-shaped and reaches
a maximum at  = 0, but it is not necessarily symmetric.
Assumption 3 x0 (x)  0.
In the dynamic political game considered, events take place according to the following
timing.
 At the beginning of time t = 0, the realization of 0 and of "i0 for each i is revealed.
 (First election). Citizens vote for either party P or party R conditionally on 0, on 0
and on "i0; a government is elected depending on the outcome of the voting process.
22As standard in probabilistic voting models (see, for example, Lindbeck and Weibull, 1987; Dixit and Lon-
dregan, 1995, 1998), both shocks reect the preferences of the agent for the non-economic policies potentially
implemented by the party in o¢ ce at time t. Note, however, that our model di¤ers from a standard probabilistic
voting model since we are not allowing parties to commit to any policy other than their own preferred one.
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 The elected government chooses and implements the policy vector h0; G0; 1i.
 At the beginning of time t = 1, the realization of 1 and of "i1 for each i is revealed.
 (Second election). Citizens vote for either party P or party R conditionally on 1, on 1
and on "i1; a government is elected depending on the outcome of the voting process.
 The elected government chooses and implements the policy vector h1; G1i, and the game
ends.
We will now proceed to characterize the Subgame Perfect Equilibria (SPE) in pure strategies
of this dynamic political game.
4 Characterization of the Equilibrium
4.1 Equilibrium in the Last Period (t = 1)
Since we have a nite game, we solve the model by backward induction by computing the
political equilibrium in the last period, t = 1. In particular, we characterize the equilibrium
of the subgame played after elections have been held and a government appointed, for every
possible history.
If in o¢ ce at period 1, party J 2 fP;Rg implements the scal policy solving the following
problem
V J1 (1j1 = J) = max
1;G1

(1  1) aJ (1) +G1 + 
	
s:t: (2),
where V J1 (1j1 = J) denotes the maximized utility of party J from being in power, condition-
ally on 1 that has been chosen by the government in o¢ ce at time t = 0. The preferred scal
policies of the two political parties at time t = 1 are described by the following propositions.
Proposition 1 A right-wing government always sets taxes at the level R1  0 and provides
no public good, so that GR1  0.
Proof. Substituting the government budget constraint (that in equilibrium holds as equal-
ity) into the objective function of party R leads to
V R1 (1j1 = R) = max1 f(1  1) a
r + 1 [a
r + (1  ) tap] + g :
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From ar < tap follows that this function is decreasing in 1 and, therefore, it is maximized at
1 = 0.
In words, a right-wing government provides no public good since it is not optimal for the
rich to spend scal revenues in G. Using Proposition 1, the per period utilities of low-skill and
high-skill producers from voting for party R are respectively
ui;p1
 
1; "
i
1; 1j'i1 = R

= 1a
p; (6)
and
ui;r1
 
1; "
i
1; 1j'i1 = R

= ar; (7)
where these expressions incorporate the normalization to zero of the ideological bias in favor
of party R (see (5)).
The scal policy of the left-wing party is characterized by the following proposition.
Proposition 2 Conditionally on 1 2

L; 1

, a left-wing government implements the follow-
ing scal policy: P1 = ^ and G
P
1 = ^a1 (1).
Proof. Taking into account the government budget constraint, the maximization problem
of the left-wing party is
V P1 (1j1 = P ) = max1 f(1  1) 1a
p + 1 [a
r + (1  ) 1ap] + g :
The objective function of party P is increasing in 1 for any 1, and is therefore maximized at
1 = ^ .
Using Proposition 2, the per period utility of a low-skill producer from voting for party P
is
ui;p1
 
1; "
i
1; 1j'i1 = P

= 1a
p +p1 (1) + "
i
1 + 1; (8)
where
p1 (1) = G
P
1   ^ 1ap = ^ (ar   1ap) > 0; (9)
denotes the net value of scal redistribution for the poor. Similarly, the per period utility of a
high-skill producer from voting for party P reads
ui;r1
 
1; "
i
1; 1j'i1 = P

= ar +r1 (1) + "
i
1 + 1; (10)
where
r1 (1) = G
P
1   ^ ar =  ^ (1  ) (ar   1ap) < 0; (11)
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is the net value of scal redistribution for the rich.
Expression (8) decomposes the per period utility of a low-skill worker into the (endogenous)
pre-tax income, 1ap, the net static economic gain from voting for the Left represented by the
net scal transfer p1 (1), and the overall (idiosyncratic plus aggregate) ideological bias in
favor of the Left. Since the Right provides no scal redistribution, p1 (1) also represents the
relative net economic gain for the low-skill agents from voting for party P rather than for party
R. Expression (10) has a similar interpretation for a high-skill worker, with the di¤erence that
the net scal redistribution for the rich, r1 (1), is negative.
A central aspect is that the potential gain from scal redistribution obtained by the lower
class is decreasing in 1 as
@p1 (1) =@1   ^ap < 0:
This is because as 1 increases both the income of each low-skill worker and the average (and
aggregate) income increase; however, the average income increases proportionally less since the
income of the high-skilled does not depend on 1. It follows that the di¤erence between the
average and personal income of the poor, and therefore the net scal transfer, decreases with
1. As we will see, this result is important because it implies that the Left can strategically
increase its comparative politico-economic value (relative to the Right) for the lower class,
p1 (1), by reducing the pre-tax income of the unskilled, i.e. of its natural constituency.
In addition, the net gain of the upper class from scal redistribution is increasing in 1
since the di¤erence between average income and income of the rich is increasing in 1, i.e.,
@r1 (1) =@1  ^ (1  ) ap > 0:
Citizen i 2 fp; rg votes for party P at time 1, 'i1 = P , if U i1
 
'i1 = P
  U i1  'i1 = R, i.e.,
U i1
 
1; "
i
1; 1j1 = P
  U i1  1; "i1; 1j1 = R ; (12)
namely if the maximized utility of citizen i when party P in o¢ ce is greater than his maximized
utility when party R is in power. Using (6) and (8), condition (12) for the low-skill citizens,
i = p, can be written as23
"i;p1   p1 (1)  1: (13)
For high-skill citizens, i = r, the substitution of (7) into (12) leads to
"i;r1   r1 (1)  1: (14)
23We denote with "i;p1 ("
i;r
1 ) the value of the idiosyncratic ideological shock of a poor (rich) citizen i for party
P at time 1 when this is necessary for clarity.
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Since p1 (1) > 0 and 
r
1 (1) < 0, and the distribution of " is the same across income groups,
the proportion of low-skill citizens voting for the Left is higher than the one of high-skill
citizens, for any value of 1. This result comes from the fact that low-skill agents benet
from scal redistribution while the high-skills are harmed by it; hence, the former group is
more inclined to support party P than the latter. Using (13) and (14), and the distributional
assumptions on the ideological shocks, the total number of votes that party P obtains in state
(1; 1) is
SP (1; 1) = (1  ) [1  F ( p1 (1)  1)] +  [1  F ( r1 (1)  1)] : (15)
The rst term on the right hand side of (15) represents the number of votes that the Left obtains
from the low-skill citizens, which is given by the mass 1   of low-skill workers multiplied by
the fraction of them, [1  F ( p1 (1)  1)], voting for party P . The second term on the
right hand side of (15) represents instead the number of votes that party P obtains from the
high-skill citizens and, again, this is given by the size of high-skill agents  multiplied by the
fraction of these, [1  F ( r1 (1)  1)], voting for the Left.
Conditionally on the realization of 1 and 1, the outcome of the election in the nal
period is straightforward. The Left wins the election with certainty if SP (1; 1) > 1=2, and
it looses the with certainty if SP (1; 1) < 1=2.
24 Since SP (1; 1) is strictly increasing in 1
for any value of 1, the condition ensuring the victory of the Left with certainty is equivalent
to  > 1(1), where the cuto¤ 1(1) is implicitly dened by the equation
SP (1; 1) = 1=2:
Using expression (15), this condition can be rewritten as
(1  )F ( p1 (1)  1(1)) + F ( r1 (1)  1(1)) = 1=2: (16)
The following proposition summarizes the results obtained up to this point.
Proposition 3 Conditionally on the realization of the aggregate ideological shock 1, the equi-
librium of the subgame beginning at period t = 1 is the following.
1. If 1 < 

1(1), party R wins the elections with certainty, i.e.  (1; 1) = R, and imple-
ments the scal policy described by Proposition 1.
2. If 1 > 

1(1), party P wins the elections with certainty, i.e.  (1; 1) = P , and imple-
ments the scal policy described by Proposition 2.
24 In the case where SP (1; 1) = 1=2, both parties win with probablity 1=2.
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3. If 1 = 

1(1), party R and party P both win the elections with probability 1=2, and the
winner implements its preferred scal policy.
Proposition 3 can be used to compute the ex-ante probability that the Right or the Left
are in power at time t = 1, namely the probability that the realization of the random variable
SP (1; 1) is respectively lower or higher than 1=2. These results are contained in the following
corollary.
Corollary 1 The ex-ante probability that party R wins the elections in the nal period is
R1 (1)  Pr

SP (1; 1) < 1=2
	
= Pr f < 1(1)g = (1(1)); (17)
and ex-ante the probability that party P wins the elections is
P1 (1)  1  (1(1)): (18)
We conclude the description of the equilibrium at period t = 1 by stating some additional
results which will be used to characterize the equilibrium at period t = 0.
Lemma 1 In the equilibrium of the subgame beginning in period t = 1, 1(1) < 0 for all 1.
Proof. Let  (h; )  (1   )F ( h   ) + F ((1   )h   ). Clearly, @ =@ < 0.
Furthermore,  (0; 0) = F (0) = 1=2 and @ (h; 0)=@h = (1   )[f((1   )h)   f( h)].
Since  < 1=2, j(1  )hj > j hj. Therefore, f((1   )h) < f( h) and @ (h; 0)=@h < 0.
Consequently,  (h; 0) < 1=2 for all h > 0. Next, note that 1(1) is the solution to the equation
 (^(ar   1ap); 1(1)) = 1=2. Since  (h; :) is decreasing in  and  (^(ar   1ap); 0) < 1=2, it
must be that 1(1) < 0.
The intuition for this result is simple. The low-skill workers are more numerous than the
high-skilled, and as the former are on average more inclined to vote for the Left than for the
Right (due to the more convenient scal policy), the two parties obtain the same number of
votes in equilibrium if there is a su¢ ciently large aggregate ideological shock in favor of the
Right. This is the case when the realization of  falls below some negative threshold.
The following lemma claries how the threshold 1(1) depends on 1.
Lemma 2 In the equilibrium of the subgame beginning in period t = 1, 01 (1)  d1(1)=d1 >
0 for all 1.
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Proof. Let us dene
zP   p1(1)  1(1); (19)
and
zR   r1(1)  1(1): (20)
From 1(1) < 0, (9), (11), and (16), we have zR > 0 > zP >  zR. Di¤erentiating (16) with
respect to 1, we get
01 (1) = (1  )ap^
f(zP )  f(zR)
(1  )f(zP ) + f(zR) : (21)
Since jzP j < jzRj, from Assumptions 1 and 2 it follows that f(zP ) > f(zR) and, therefore,
01 (1) > 0.
Intuitively, the threshold 1(1) is increasing in the last period productivity of low-skill
agents because as these become richer, they gain less from scal redistribution, and therefore
they are less inclined to voting for the Left. A greater 1 also increases the fraction of rich
voting for the left. But, as the rich are less numerous than the poor, the net e¤ect is that
the overall probability of the Left winning the election falls with 1. This is a key result of
the model, which will explain why, under some conditions, the Left may choose to reduce the
income of its own natural constituency in order to consolidate its own future political power.
4.2 Equilibrium in the Initial Period (t = 0)
We now complete the backward induction solution of the political game by computing the
equilibrium of the subgame of the stage game played at time t = 0 after elections have been
held and a government appointed. Conditionally on the exogenous level of 0, the optimal
policy of party J at that point in time solves the following problem
V J0 (0) = max
0;G0;1

(1  0) aJ (0) +G0

+  + E

V J1 (; 1)
	
;
s:t: (2),
where E

V J1 (; 1)

is the expected continuation value (with respect to the realization of )
of party J conditionally on 1, dened as
E

V J1 (; 1)

=
Z
V J1 (1j1 (; 1)) () d:
Using Proposition 3, this value can be rewritten as
E

V J1 (; 1)

= P1 (1)V
J
1 (1j1 = P ) + R1 (1)V J1 (1j1 = R) : (22)
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Expression (22) reects the expectation that in period t = 1 party P will be in o¢ ce with
probability P1 (1), in which case party J obtains utility V
J
1 (1j1 = P ), and that party R
is in power with the complementary probability R1 (1) = 1   P1 (1), in which case party
Js utility is V J1 (1j1 = R). The expected continuation value of party J is a¤ected by the
uncertainty relative to the exogenous future realization of the aggregate ideological shock, 1,
the endogenous choice of 1, and the future allocation of political power 1 2 fP;Rg that also
depends on the two aggregate state variables of the model.25
Since the choice of 1 is made at no resource cost, it can be separated from the scal policy
decisions, which are still described by Propositions 1 and 2. Party J chooses the optimal value
of 1 solving the following maximization problem
J1 = arg max
12[L;1]
E

V J1 (; 1)

:
Using Propositions 1 and 2, and Corollary 1, the expected continuation value E

V J1 (; 1)

of party J = P in period 1 can be written as
V P1 (1)  E

V P1 (; 1)

= 1a
p + [1  (1(1))] [ +p1 (1)] ; (23)
and it is the case that
@V P1 (1)
@1
= ap   [1  (1(1))] ^ap   (1(1))01 (1) [ +p1 (1)] : (24)
The sign of this derivative is generally ambiguous. The rst term is positive since it reects
the standard welfare gain that the low-skill agents obtain when they become more productive
at the margin, which is partially internalized by party P . The second term is negative since it
reects the loss in scal redistribution that the low-skilled experience when their productivity
becomes higher, whenever the Left is in power.26 The third term is also negative (note that
01 (1) > 0 from Lemma 2), as it represents the loss of party P due to the reduced chances
of winning the elections in period 1 when 1 increases. This utility loss includes both the
o¢ ce rent (which the left party P does not get if the Right is in power) and the scal transfer
potentially beneting the lower class (which party P internalizes due to its partial altruism).
Similarly, the expected value E

V J1 (; 1)

of party J = R in period 1 is given by
V R1 (1) = a
r +(1(1)) + [1  (1(1))]r1 (1) ;
25The notation used reects that the realization of  a¤ects the welfare of party J only indirectly, i.e., only
by inuencing the probability of winning the elections, and therefore the future allocation of political power.
26 If the Right is in power in period 1 there is no scal redistribution, and therefore this e¤ect is absent. Also
note that the sum of the rst two terms is positive and represents the expected increase in the ex-post tax
income and transfers following an increase in 1.
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and the derivative of the expression with respect to our policy variable of interest reads
@V R1 (1)
@1
= [1  (1(1))] ^ (1  ) ap + (1(1))01 (1) [  r1 (1)] > 0: (25)
Equation (25), unlike (24), contains only positive terms, which means that the objective func-
tion of the Right party is strictly increasing in 1. A higher value of 1 increases the utility of
party R directly by increasing both the income of the poor and the aggregate income, which
leads to lower taxes for the rich when the Left is in power (rst term of (25)), and indirectly
by increasing the probability of electoral victory of the right-wing party (second term in (25)).
The following proposition summarizes these results.
Lemma 3 When in power in the initial period (t = 0), party R always sets the value of 1
at level R1 = 1, while the optimal value of 1 for party P is the solution to the following
maximization problem
1  P1 = arg max
12[L;1]
V P1 (1) = 1a
p + [1  (1(1))] [ +p1(1)] : (26)
Proof. In the text.
Remark 1 Since the program of party P involves the maximization of a continuous function
over a compact interval, it has a solution by Weierstrass theorem. If there is more than one
solution, we invoke a standard Paretian e¢ ciency argument to select the largest value of 1 as
the equilibrium value when the Left is in power.
Remark 2 Since the function (24) is continuous and bounded in 1, there exists a nite value
of  independent of 1, that we call , such that V P1 (1; ) is everywhere decreasing in 1 for
any  > .27 In this case, the political rents are su¢ ciently large to insure that the program
of party P has the lower corner solution 1 = 
L.
We now discuss how election results are determined in the initial period (t = 0).
Anticipating the policy vector potentially chosen by each party, a low-skill citizen, i = p,
votes for party P at time 0, 'i;p0 = P , if U
i;p
0 ('
i;p
0 = P )  U i;p0 ('i;p0 = R), i.e.,
U i;p0 (0; "
i;p
0 ; 0j0 = P )  U i;p0 (0; "i;p0 ; 0j0 = R);
27This follows readily upon inspection of equation (24), which is continuous and bounded in 1 for the following
reasons. First, 1 is locally a C
1 function of 1 for all 1 by the implicit function theorem; therefore, 1 is
globally a continuous and bounded function of 1 on the compact interval [L; 1]. Second, () is a continuous
and bounded function of  over its support by assumption. Finally, 01 (1) is also continuous and bounded, as
can be immediately veried by inspecting equation (21) (recall that f() is a continuos and bounded function
over its support by assumption).
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where the left (right) hand side is the expected discounted maximized utility of a poor citizen
when the left-wing (right-wing) party is in power. This condition can be rewritten as
(1  ^)0ap + ^ [ar + (1  )0ap] + "i;p0 + 0 + Up1 (P1 )  0ap + Up1 (1);
where Up1 (
P
1 ) and U
p
1 (1)  Up1 (R1 ) denote the expected value of the low-skill producers at time
t = 1 when respectively party P and party R win the elections at time t = 0. From Lemma 3,
1 is set to P1  1 given by (26) in the rst case, and to R1 = 1 in the second one.
From the analysis of the voting decision of the poor, that we do not repeat in detail as it
is similar to the one presented above for period 1, we obtain that a low-skill citizen votes for
the Left ('i;p0 = P ) if
"i;p0   p0(0)  0;
where
p0(0) = ^(a
r   0ap) +  [Up1 (1)  Up1 (1)] : (27)
Similarly, a high-skill citizen votes for the party P at time 0 ('i;r0 = P ) if
"i;r0   r0(0)  0;
with
r0(0)   ^(1  )(ar   0ap) +  [U r1 (1)  U r1 (1)] < 0: (28)
Again, U r1 (

1) and U
r
1 (1) are the expected value of the high-skill producers at time t = 1 when
party P and party R are in power at t = 0 respectively.28
It is worth noting that these conditions di¤er from those derived for the second period of the
game since they are dynamic voting rules. In fact, citizens anticipate that their future utility
depends on the current elected government which chooses the value of the future productivity
of the low-skill workers (i.e., the government at time 0 can manipulatethe electoral outcome
in the next period through the strategic choice of the endogenous state variable, 1). This
choice a¤ects the utility of the citizens directly and indirectly by changing the probability of
being in o¢ ce by the two parties.
In particular, when the Left is also expected to choose 1 = 1 if in power, the continu-
ation value implicitly promised by both parties to the rich and to the poor is the same. In
this case, the structure of the voting rules in the rst and second period coincide and citizens
discriminate between the two parties depending only on the present welfare that they promise
28 It is worth noting that while r0(0) is always negative since U
r
1 (

1) < U
r
1 (1), 
p
0(0)may have an ambiguous
sign as Up1 (

1) may be lower than U
p
1 (1).
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to the voters. This is an equilibrium with no political entrenchment which has two important
features. First, it is Pareto e¢ cient since potential output is maximized. Second, and more
subtly, the equilibrium features no persistence of political power, in the sense that the probabil-
ity that each party is in power at time 1 does not depend on which party is in power in the rst
period. When instead the Left is expected to choose 1 < 1 if in power, the continuation value
promised by the two parties to the rich and to the poor di¤ers. This is an equilibrium with
political entrenchment and it is characterized by the fact that the left-wing party deliberately
reduces the income of its constituency in order to consolidate its power. This equilibrium has
two important features. First, it is Pareto ine¢ cient since potential output is not maximized.
Second, there is persistence of political power, in the sense that the probability that party P
is power at time 1, P1 (

1), depends on which party is in power at time 0. In particular,
Pr f1 = P j0 = Pg = P1 (1) > Pr f1 = P j0 = Rg = P1 (1)
for all 1 < 1, as P1 (

1) = 1  (1(1)) and 01 (1) > 0.
The number of votes that party P obtains in the rst period is
SP (0; 0) = (1  ) [1  F ( p0 (0)  0)] +  [1  F ( r0 (0)  0)] : (29)
As before, party P wins the election with certainty if SP (0; 0) > 1=2, which is the case when
 > 0(0), where 0(0) is dened as the value of 0 satisfying the condition29
SP (0(0); 0) = 1=2; (30)
with SP () dened by (29).
The following proposition provides a complete characterization of the equilibrium in the
rst period of the game.
Proposition 4 The equilibrium of the subgame beginning at period t = 0 is as follows:
1. If 0 < 

0(0), party R wins elections, implements the scal policy (
R
0 = 0; G
R
0 = 0),
and sets R1 = 1.
2. If 0 > 

0(0), party P wins elections and implements the scal policy (
P
0 = ^ ; G
P
0 =
^a0(0)). Moreover, party P chooses P1  1 2

L; 1

as dened in Lemma 3.
29Note that 0 also depends on 1 since 
p
0(0) and 
r
0(0) (see respectively (27) and (28)) are a¤ected by
this state variable. To simplify the notation, we will use 0(0) rather than 

0(0; 

1) when this does not make
confusion.
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3. If 0 = 

0(0), party R wins the elections with probability 1=2 and implements the policy
described in case 1; party P wins the elections with probability 1=2 and implements the
policy described in case 2.
Proof. In the text.
The equilibrium at time 0 dened in Proposition 4 is similar to that one of period 1
contained in Proposition 3. It is also immediate to verify that the threshold 0(0) is increasing
in 0, since the potential gain from scal redistribution, and therefore the bias of the low-skill
agents in favor of the Left, decreases as their pre-tax income increases relative to the average
income. An important implication of this result and of Proposition 4 is that the equilibrium
value of ; as well as the identity if the party in power, potentially exhibit a form of path
dependence. This is because the threshold 0(0), and therefore the probability that the Right
is in power in period t = 0, increases with 0. Hence, if 0 is relatively high, then the probability
that the Right is in power in period t = 0 is also high, and so will be the value of 1 as this
party chooses 1 = 1. In turn, a high value of 1 implies a relatively higher probability that
the Right is in power at time t = 1. Similarly, the lower is 0, the higher is the probability
that the Left will be in o¢ ce in both periods.
5 Comparative Statics
We now move to analyze how some parameters of the model change the degree of entrenchment
of the Left, namely how they a¤ect the level of productivity of the low-skilled chosen by party
P when in power in the initial period. In particular, we determine how 1 changes when there
is a variation in the benet  of the party from being in power, a variation in the exogenous
component of the balance of power between Left and Right, and a change in state capacity ^ .
As the objective function (23) of the Left is not generally concave in 1, we cannot apply
the standard methods (based on the implicit di¤erentiation of the rst order condition) to
characterize the comparative statics properties of the equilibrium. For this reason the analysis
will be conducted using the techniques of monotone comparative statics (e.g., Milgrom and
Shannon, 1994; Topkis, 1998).
5.1 An Increase in O¢ ce Rents
An increase in the rents  from power always increase the incentive of the Left for entrenchment,
namely it leads party P to choose a (weakly) lower level of 1. This result comes from the fact
that V P1 (1; ) is submodular in (1; ), i.e., @
2V P1 (1; ) =@1@ < 0, so that @

1=@  0 by
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Topkistheorem (Topkis, 1998). In fact, from (24) we obtain that
@2V P1 (1; )
@1@
=  (1(1))01 (1);
which is always negative. By Topkistheorem, this implies that 1 is nonincreasing in  (i.e.,
@1=@  0).30 The intuition for this result is straightforward. As the gains from being in
o¢ ce increase, party P will want to increase the probability of winning the elections at time
1, which is possible by decreasing the pre-tax income of its constituency (namely by choosing
a lower value of 1).
5.2 E¤ects of the Inter-Party Balance of Power
We now consider the e¤ect of an exogenous variation in the balance of power in favor of the Left
on 1. A way to model this bias is by considering a shift to the right in the distribution function
of the ideological bias " of the citizens for party P . Formally, the cumulative distribution
function of " can be rewritten as F (" ), with the density function equal to f(" )  F 0(" ),
where  is the mean of the distribution ( = 0 corresponds to our baseline model).31 An
increase in  implies a bias in favor of the Left. In order to determine the sign of @1=@, we
explore whether V P1 (1; ) is supermodular or submodular in (1; ). From (24), we have that
@2V P1 (1; )
@1@
= (1(1))
@1(1)
@
^ap   0(1(1))
@1(1)
@
01 (1) [ +
p
1(1)]
 (1(1))
@01 (1)
@
[ +p1(1)] :
By di¤erentiating (16), it can be easily shown that @1(1)=@ =  1 and @01 (1)=@ = 0, so
that
@2V P1 (1; )
@1@
=  (1(1))^ap + 0(1(1))01 (1) [ +p1(1)] : (31)
The rst term in (31) is negative, which implies that 1 is nonincreasing in  (i.e., @

1=@  0),
and it represents the appropriation e¤ect. A higher  means that citizens have a positive bias
in favor of the Left, that will then be in power more often. This implies that, ceteris paribus,
the poor will get income redistribution more often and, therefore, that the cost of entrenchment
(i.e., of a lower pre-tax income) for party P , that internalizes to some extent the utility of the
poor, is smaller.32 This leads that party to entrench more, namely to choose a lower level of
30The notation used to write the expression of the value function V P1 (1; ) reects that 1 is an endogenous
state variable whereas  represents an exogenous parameter of the model.
31Note that Assumptions 1 and 2 are no longer valid. However, if  is not too large, the critical property of
the equilibrium that the marginal density of swing voters is lower among the rich than among the poor, which
is behind Lemmas 1 and 2, still holds.
32 It is useful to remind that income redistribution partially o¤set the income loss of the poor generated by a
lower level of their productivity.
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1. The second term in (31) is instead positive, which leads to 

1 being nondecreasing in 
(i.e., @1=@  0), and it represents the decreasing marginal political return e¤ect. A positive
bias in favor of party P (higher ) reduces the local density of marginal swing voters. This is
due to the fact that @1(1)=@ < 0 and Assumption 3 which implies that 
0(1(1)) > 0 as
1(1) < 0. Given the existence of fewer citizens at the margin (i.e., 
0(1(1))01 (1) > 0), a
reduction of 1 would lead to a lower increase in the votes gained by the Left, which means
that the marginal political return from entrenchment (a lower 1) decreases with . This leads
to a higher 1 and to less entrenchment.
As the sign of (31), and therefore of @1=@, is generally ambiguous, so will be the e¤ect of
a positive bias in favor of the Left on entrenchment. However, one can observe that the second
term in (31) depends on  while the rst term does not. This means that when the rents  from
o¢ ce are su¢ ciently high, the decreasing marginal political return e¤ect is likely to dominate
over the appropriation e¤ect, which implies that a positive bias of the citizens for the Left leads
to less entrenchment (@2V P1 (1; )=@1@ > 0 and @

1=@  0). The intuition is the following.
The appropriation e¤ect comes from the citizen-candidatepart of the politiciansobjective
function; as individuals or as agents of a social constituency, they also lose from entrenchment,
and any reduction in this loss will increase their incentives to entrench. On the other hand,
the decreasing marginal political returns e¤ect is driven by the cross-e¤ect of the change in
the parameter of interest (here, ) and of  on the reelection probability. Here it tells us that
entrenchment yields less political leverage, the higher , because people like the Left more and
their voting behavior is therefore less elastic to the choice of .33
5.3 The E¤ect of State Fiscal Capacity
We now analyze the e¤ect of a higher state capacity ^ on the entrenchment of the Left. Again,
from (24), we obtain
@2V P1 (1; ^)
@1@^
=  (1(1))01 (1)(ar   1ap)  [1  (1(1))]ap (32)
+^ap(1(1))
@1(1)
@^
  0(1(1))01 (1) [ +p1(1)]
@1(1)
@^
 (1(1))
@21(1)
@1@^
[ +p1(1)] :
This expression includes two derivatives that we need to compute.
33This is true because in the original situation, the Left already has more power due to the fact that the
poor are more numerous. This makes the marginal swing voters atypically averse to the Left. An increase in 
further increases the Lefts political power, thus making the swing voters even more atypical, i.e., less numerous.
Consequently, the electoral benets from entrenchment are reduced.
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To determine @1(1)=@^ , we derive the implicit function (16) dening 1(1) with respect
to ^ and use (19) and (20), which leads to
@1(1)
@^
=  (1  ) (ar   1ap) f(zP )  f(zR)
(1  )f(zP ) + f(zR) < 0;
as f(zP ) > f(zR).
Moreover, di¤erentiating the RHS of (21) with respect to ^ we get
@21(1)
@1@^
= (1  )ap f(zP )  f(zR)
(1  )f(zP ) + f(zR) (33)
 (1  )^ ap (ar   1ap) [(1  ) f(zP )f
0(zR) + f(zR)f 0(zP )]
[(1  )f(zP ) + f(zR)]2
 (1  )^ ap@

1(1)
@^
f(zR)f
0(zP )  f(zP )f 0(zR)
[(1  )f(zP ) + f(zR)]2
;
which is generally ambiguous as the rst term is positive, the second is ambiguous and the last
term is positive since f 0(zP ) > 0 and f 0(zR) < 0 (from zR > 0 > zP and Assumption 2).34
34Remember that when 1 goes up, the benets of redistribution fall. Therefore, the poor swing voter dislikes
the Left less, while the rich one likes it less. Both swing voters become less extreme. (Remember that the poor
swing voter dislikes the Left, while the rich one likes it). As is clear from equation (21), the intensity of this
e¤ect is proportional to the extent of redistribution, i.e. to state capacity ^ . Furthermore, the net e¤ect of
these shifts on the net propensity to vote for the Left depends on the di¤erence between the marginal density
of poor swing voters f(zP ) and the marginal density of rich voters f(zR). This di¤erence is positive due to
our assumptions about the shape of f() and the proportion of poor. Finally, the response of the critical 1 is
larger, the smaller the average density of swing voters, (1  )f(zP ) + f(zR). This is because the smaller this
density, the greater the change in  which is needed at the margin to switch the balance of power by a given
number of votes. Since the number of votes for the Left lost due to a higher 1 is also proportional to these
marginal densities, what matters for the response of 1 to 1 is the relative density of swing voters f(zp)=f(zR),
as implied by the fraction expression in (21).
Therefore we see that the increase in 1, and therefore the reduction in the Lefts probability of winning the
next election, is larger, the greater the state capacity and the greater the relative density of swing voters.
How does this response of 1 to 1 change when state capacity becomes larger? The answer is in the RHS
of (33). First there is the direct e¤ect of ^ , which increases the intensity of preferences for redistribution and
therefore the magnitude with which the swing voters move to the center. This e¤ect tends to magnify the
positive response of 1 to 1 (which in itself tends to increase entrenchment). Hence the rst term on the RHS
of (33).
Second, ^ has a direct impact on the ideological preferences of the poor and the rich swing voters, zP and
zR. As more is redistributed from rich to poor whenever the Left is in power, fewer rich people, and more poor
people, vote in its favor. Consequently, the poor swing voter dislikes the Left more, while the rich swing voter
likes it more. The marginal density of swing voters falls for both the poor and the rich, and therefore the e¤ect
on the relative density is ambiguous. This is captured by the second term in the RHS of (33). However, if it were
the case that jf 0(x)=f(x)j were nonincreasing with jxj, then we would have that  f 0(zR)=f(zR)  f 0(zP )=f(zP )
and this second term would be non negative.
Finally, ^ has an indirect e¤ect on the identity of the swing voters through its e¤ect on 1. We know that
@1=@^ < 0, meaning that the Left wins the election more often when state capacity is larger, due to the fact
that the poor are a majority. Thus, the aggregate ideological shock beyond which the Left wins the election is
more unfavorable to the Left, meaning that the corresponding swing voters have an increased own taste for the
Left. Therefore, zP and zR both go up. This makes the poor swing voter less extreme (i.e. disliking the Left
less) and the rich swing voter more extreme (i.e. liking the Left more). This raises f(zP ) and reduces f(zR).
Therefore, the relative density f(zP )=f(zR) goes up, which increases the votes lost by the Left when 1 goes
up, thus increasing 01 (1). Hence the third term in the RHS of (33), which is positive.
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The rst three terms in (32) are negative and they represent the appropriation e¤ect gen-
erated by a higher feasible tax rate. These components push towards a reduction of 1 as ^
increases (i.e., @1=@^  0). The interpretation of these components is the following. The rst
term comes from the fact that the poor gain more from the Left in power when ^ is higher.
Hence, the higher is ^ and the higher is the incentive for party P to reduce 1 in order to
increase the probability of being elected. The second term captures the expected increase in
redistribution, which takes place when the Left is in power, generated by a higher ^ . This
reduces the cost of a lower pre-tax income of the poor (i.e., of a lower 1) so favoring entrench-
ment. The third term accounts for the fact that a higher ^ reduces 1(1) making the Left
more popular and more often in power. Again, this reduces the cost of a lower pre-tax income
of the poor and favors entrenchment.
The last two terms in (32) represent the marginal political return e¤ect generated by the
increase in state capacity. The fourth term is positive and comes from the fact that the increase
in ^ reduces 1(1) (the Left is more popular), which in turn leads to a reduction in the mass of
citizens at the margin. Hence, a lower level of 1 would lead to a smaller increase in the votes
gained by the Left. This lowers the scope for entrenchment and leads to a higher 1. The nal
term captures the direct e¤ect of ^ on the responsiveness of election outcomes to entrenchment,
as captured by 01 (1), and it can be positive or negative. In sum, as the appropriation e¤ect
and the marginal political return e¤ect may have opposite sign, the total e¤ect of higher state
capacity on the choice of 1 will generally be ambiguous. Nevertheless, in some special cases,
which are described next, the e¤ect of state capacity on entrenchment is not ambiguous.
A higher degree of income inequality has an e¤ect on the choice of 1 very similar to that
of state capacity. The analysis is reported in Appendix.
The following lemma summarizes the results obtained above.
Lemma 4 The preferred level of productivity of the low-skill producers 1 from the point of
view of party P has the following features.
1. An increase in the rents  from o¢ ce (weakly) reduces 1 (i.e., @

1=@  0).
2. A positive bias  in favor of the Left has an ambiguous e¤ect on 1, and reduces en-
trenchment when the rents from o¢ ce are su¢ ciently high (i.e., @1=@  0).
3. A higher level of state capacity ^ has in general an ambiguous e¤ect on 1.
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5.4 Some Parametric Cases
We can obtain sharper results concerning the comparative statics properties of the political
equilibrium if the following additional restrictions are imposed on the functional form of the
densities of the two ideological shocks.
Condition 1. The density of the aggregate popularity shock  has the following property:
0 (x) = (x)  1=  +p1(L).35
Condition 2. The density of the idiosyncratic popularity shock " is such that jf 0 (x) =f (x)j
is weakly increasing in jxj.36
If Conditions 1 and 2 hold, it is straightforward to verify the following set of results.
Lemma 5 The preferred level of productivity of the low-skill producers 1 from the point of
view of party P has the following features.
1. Same as Point 1 in Lemma 4 regardless on distributional assumption.
2. A positive bias  in favor of the Left increases entrenchment (i.e., @1=@  0).
3. A higher level of state capacity ^ increases entrenchment (i.e., @1=@^  0).
Proof. Point 2. Note that 01 (1) is bounded from above by ^ap; using this result,
and the fact that p1(1) is decreasing in 1 and therefore it is maximized at 1 = 
L, it is
straightforward to verify that @2V P1 (1; )=@1@ < 0 everywhere if Condition 1 is satised.
Point 3. Condition 2 ensures that  f 0(zR)=f(zR)  f 0(zP )=f(zP ) since jzP j < jzRj, which
implies that also the second term in equation (32) is positive, so that @21(1)=@1@^ > 0.
Condition 1 guarantees that the algebraic sum of the third and fourth terms in equation (32)
is negative, again since 01 (1) is bounded from above by ^ap and 
p
1(1) is maximized at
1 = 
L, which implies that @2V P1 (1; ^)=@1@^ < 0 everywhere.
Intuitively, Condition 1 implies that the marginal density of the aggregate shock is not too
much jumpy,which means that relatively few voters can be captured by Left by reducing
entrenchment. As a result, the appropriation e¤ect of a greater political bias in favor of the
Left, which leads to more entrenchment, dominates over the marginal political return e¤ect,
which has the opposite e¤ect, and therefore entrenchment increases in the political equilibrium.
35Note that this condition is satised, in particular, if the aggregate popularity shock has a uniform distribution
(and therefore 0(x) = 0 for any x), as it is often assumed in political economy models based on probabilistic
voting.
36Note that a number of important continuous distribution has this property, including the Gaussian and the
double-exponential distribution.
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Point 2 in Lemma 5 is particularly interesting since it implies that less political competition
(or, more precisely, greater exogenous insulation of the Left when in o¢ ce) may lead to more
distortions, in the form of higher equilibrium entrenchment. In this respect, our result is
consistent with the recent nding of Acemoglu, Golosov and Tsyvinski (2012) that politicians
facing a higher e¤ective discount factor (which will be the case if they expect to stay in
power longer) are likely to implement macroeconomic policies featuring more, rather than
less, political distortions. This conclusion contradicts one of the main insights of the previous
literature (e.g., Barro, 1973; Ferejohn, 1986; Persson, Roland and Tabellini, 1997), according
to which more stability of power should be conducive to better policies and allocations of
resources, by alleviating the political agency problem arising between voters and politicians.
Condition 1 also implies that the appropriation e¤ect of greater state capacity, which leads
to more entrenchment, dominates over the marginal political return e¤ect, which has the
opposite e¤ect, and therefore makes sure that higher state capacity boosts the incentive of
Left to invest in entrenchment. See also Footnote 34 for the intuition of the role played by
Condition 2 in determining how state capacity a¤ects directly the responsiveness of electoral
outcomes to entrenchment, and therefore the overall sign of the political marginal return e¤ect
which is in general ambiguous.
Another special case of interest is the one obtaining when state capacity is small enough.
Lemma 6 If ^ is small enough, higher state capacity generates more political entrenchments.
Proof. As ^ # 0, 01 (1) # 0, and zP and zR both tend to zero, which means that also
[f(zP )  f(zR)] tend to zero. This in turn implies that @1(1)=@^ " 0 and @21(1)=@1@^ # 0,
so that from (24) follows that
lim
^!0
@2V P1 (1; ^)
@1@^
=   [1  (1(1))]ap < 0:
Therefore, if state capacity is limited, by submodularity it follows that higher state capacity
weakly increases entrenchment by the Left (i.e., @1=@^  0).
Intuitively, as state capacity tends to zero, only the appropriation e¤ect of higher state
capacity on entrenchment survives, whereas the decreasing marginal political return e¤ect van-
ishes entirely; hence, equilibrium entrenchment is unambiguously higher. In particular, higher
state capacity reduces the marginal loss that the low-skill people experience as entrenchment
increases (conditionally on the electoral success of the Left) due to their lower productiv-
ity, by allowing for more redistribution and, therefore, it increases the extent of equilibrium
entrenchment.
31
Lemma 5 (Point 3) and Lemma 6 are of special interests since they imply that higher
state capacity is not necessarily benecial for the society but that, under some conditions,
it may actually turn out to reduce its welfare. Specically, according to our model, higher
state capacity may be socially harmful by giving to the government currently in power more
incentives to consolidate its own future power. Note also that since a low level of state capacity
is characteristic of developing economies, Lemma 6 suggests that an autonomous increase in
state capacity, is particularly likely to have harmful consequences for developing countries.
While the conventional wisdom view (e.g., Besley and Persson, 2009) is that higher state
capacity is generally socially benecial, our result is more in line with Acemoglu (2010) who
makes the similar point that an autonomous increment in state capacity (not accompanied by
an appropriate change in political institutions) may be socially harmful.
6 The Incentive of the Left to Limit Entrenchment Policies
In our analysis we have assumed that 1 has an exogenous lower bound at L > 0. When
this constraint is binding, i.e. 1 = 
L, a lower value of L means that the Left potentially
has a greater capacity to manipulate the economy for electoral purposes if it is in power in
the initial period; remember that the higher the reduction of income of the poor, the higher
the probability that the Left wins the elections in the following period. Nevertheless, lower
values of L may also turn against the left-wing party because the low-skill citizens have lower
incentives to vote for this party in the rst period since entrenchment reduces their future
income. Therefore, if the Left could freely set the value of L before the rst elections are
held, it would not necessarily choose a low value or the minimum possible one (L = 0). In
other words, there can be situations where it is optimal for the left-wing party to commit not
to reduce the welfare of its own constituency beyond a certain point in the future in order not
to become too much unpopular at the rst electoral round. In this Section we analyze when
this is the case.
To make this point, we consider the case where L is endogenous and chosen by the Left
before the rst elections are held, and analyze under what conditions this party prefers to
constrain itself by choosing relatively high values of L. In order to simplify the analysis and
make it more transparent, we focus on the case where the left-wing party prefers committing
to not undertaking entrenchment policies in the future, which corresponds to choosing a value
of L equal to 1.
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The maximized expected utility of the Left at t = 0 is given by
V P0 (0; 

1) = [1  (0(0; 1))]

0a
p + ^(ar   0ap) +  + V P1 (1)

(34)
+(0(0; 

1))

0a
p + V P1 (1)

;
where we have emphasized that 0 dened by (30) also depends from the optimal value of
the 1 chosen by the party in power in the rst period and reported in Lemma 3. The rst
term of (34) represents the expected utility that the Left obtains if it wins the rst round of
elections; this event occurs with probability 1 (0(0; 1)), 1 is set at the level 1 2

L; 1

and V P1 (

1) is the expected utility of the Left at t = 1 as dened by (23). The second term of
(34) is the expected utility of this party if the Right wins the rst round of elections, which
happens with probability (0(0; 

1)); this party sets 1 = 1 and V
P
1 (1) is the expected utility
of the Left at t = 1 as dened by (23) with 1 = 1.
We consider the case where the constraint 1  L is binding, so that the Left sets 1 = L
when in power in the rst period. A su¢ cient condition ensuring this is that @V P1 (1)=@1 < 0
for all 1 2

L; 1

; Remark 2 claries that this is always the case when the o¢ ce rents are
su¢ ciently high (  ). We then analyze under what conditions the Left prefers setting
L = 1 before elections are held in the rst period, so giving up the possibility of pursuing
entrenchment policies once in power. A su¢ cient condition for this result is that V P0 (
L) is
monotonically increasing in L for all L 2 [0; 1].
If 1 = 
L, then the value in (34) becomes
V P0 (0; 
L) =

1  (0(0; L))
 
0a
p + ^(ar   0ap) +  + V P1 (L)

+(0(0; 
L))

0a
p + V P1 (1)

;
which implies that
@V P0 (
L)
@L
=

1  (0(L))


@V P1 (
L)
@L
(35)
 (0(L))
@0(
L)
@L

^(ar   0ap) +  + 

V P1 (
L)  V P1 (1)
	
;
where to simplify the notation we have omitted the dependency of 0 and V P0 from 0. The
rst component of (35) is negative since @V P1 (1)=@1 < 0 for all 1 2

L; 1

, and it represents
the reduction of the expected utility of the Left that an increase in L induces through the
reduction of the probability of winning the elections at time t = 1; a higher L lowers the
future utility of the party because it reduces its probability to be in power in the future by
limiting the size of the entrenchment policies. This e¤ect leads the party to choose low values
33
of L. The second component represents the variation in the expected utility of the Left that
an increase in L generates through the change in the probability of winning the elections at
time t = 0; this change has the same sign as @0(
L)=@L, since V P1 (
L) > V P1 (1) from the fact
that @V P1 (1)=@1 < 0 for all 1 2

L; 1

. The term  (0(L))(@0(L)=@L) represents the
variation in the probability that the Left wins the elections at time t = 0 when L increases,
while the expression in brace brackets is the expected utility gain of this party from being in
power in the initial period.
If @0(
L)=@L is nonnegative for all L 2 [0; 1], then @V P0 (L)=@L is always negative
and the left-wing party prefers the lowest possible value of L also before the rst elections
are held. In the Appendix, we show that @0(
L)=@L < 0 when state capacity is su¢ ciently
small. This implies that  (0(L))(@0(L)=@L) > 0, so that lower values of L reduce
the probability that the Left wins the elections in the rst period as citizens anticipate the
higher losses from the entrenchment policies implemented by this party when in power. When
this e¤ect is su¢ ciently strong, then it is possible that @V P0 (
L)=@L > 0 and that the left-
wing party prefers choosing a high value of L, so limiting its future possibilities of adopting
entrenchment policies.
While the sign of @V P0 (
L)=@L is in general ambiguous, we can prove the following result.
Lemma 7 If ^ is small enough and  is higher than a certain threshold (i.e.,  >  
maxf; ~g, where ~ = ap and  is dened in Remark 2), the Left prefers setting L = 1 (i.e.,
@V P0 (
L)=@L > 0 for all L 2 [0; 1]), which means that party P would ex-ante prefer to give
up the possibility of implementing entrenchment policies once in power.
Proof. See Appendix.
The intuition for the result in Lemma 7 is the following. Under some conditions, the
entrenchment policies may be so harmful for the low-skill individuals that they have strong
incentives to voting for the Right in order to avoid them. The consequent reduction in the
probability of winning the elections in the rst period may be so high for the Left that it
may prefer to committing not to implement such policies once in power, which means setting
L = 1. This is likely to be case when state capacity is low, as in this case the low-skill agents
have less to gain from the Left in power and are therefore more inclined to voting for the Right
if they anticipate that the left-wing party will implement entrenchment policies.
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7 Extension: The Possibility of Entrenchment by the Right
In this section, we extend the baseline version of the model by assuming that the policy variable
 also a¤ects the income of the rich, and show that also the Right might pursue entrenchment
policies damaging their own constituency in order to obtain electoral gains. In particular, we
now assume that the pre-tax income of each high-skill agent is
ar(; ) = (1 + )ar;
where  can be positive or negative. To make sure that the rich have a pre-tax income higher
than the poor for any level of , we make the following assumption.
Assumption 4  > (ap=ar)  1  :
The aggregate and average level of income can now be written as
a(; )  ar + [ar + (1  )ap] :
Note that when  > 0 the income of both groups, the high-skilled and the low-skilled, is
increasing in . Therefore, a reduction of  harms both groups, thus generating an ine¢ cient
outcome. Conversely, when  < 0 the pre-tax income of the rich is decreasing in  and a
reduction of  harms the poor and benet the rich, but it may increase or decrease aggregate
output; this case may capture those policies that damage directly the unskilled but benet
directly the skilled, such as permitting the immigration of unskilled labor, which corresponds
to a reduction of  when  < 0. The following Corollary summarizes these points.
Corollary 2 A change in  has the following e¤ects on individual and aggregate productivity.
1. If  > 0, a fall in  harms both groups, and reduces aggregate output; hence, the socially
e¢ cient value of  is 1.
2. If  < 0, a fall in  harms the poor and benets the rich. Moreover,
2a. if  (1  )ap=ar <  < 0, a fall in  leads to aggregate productivity losses; hence, as in
the baseline model, the socially e¢ cient value of  is 1;
2b. if  <  (1 )ap=ar, a fall in  leads to aggregate productivity gains; hence, the socially
e¢ cient value of  is L.37
37This last range of parameters in non-empty if and only if ap=ar < , which is the case when  <  (1  
)ap=ar.
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The analysis of the equilibrium of the subgame played at time t = 1 is basically unchanged
and will not be repeated in detail. In particular, since the value of 1 has been already
determined at this point, the only action happening in the second stage of the game is the
counting of votes. Again, there will exist a threshold value 1(1) such that the Left wins when
 > 1(1), and vice versa.
To understand the incentives of the two parties to manipulate strategically 1 in this new
environment, it is useful to look at net value of scal redistribution for the two income groups,
which is the endogenous determinant of the period 1 voting rules (see expression (13) and
(14)). The net value of the scal transfer obtained by the poor and the rich when the Left is
in power is respectively given by
p1(1; ) = ^ [(1 + 1)a
r   1ap] ; (36)
and
r1(1; ) =  ^(1  ) [(1 + 1)ar   1ap] : (37)
Di¤erentiating these expressions with respect to 1, we obtain that
@p1(1; )=@1 = ^(a
r   ap);
and
@r1(1; )=@1 =  ^(1  )(ar   ap):
The main di¤erence with the baseline model is that p1(1; ) and 
r
1(1; ) may now increase
or decrease with 1 depending on the value of . As we will see, there exists now conditions
under which the Right may have the incentive to entrench itself, i.e., to reduce the future
income of its constituency in order to consolidate its political power. Moreover, if the political
rents  appropriated by incumbent politicians are su¢ ciently high, social welfare (measured
by aggregate output) will not necessarily be reduced by entrenchment policies and may in
some cases even increase, in contrast to the baseline model where higher levels of  never raise
aggregate output.38
It is useful to remember that the value of 1 chosen by the party in o¢ ce in the rst period
is a¤ected by two forces. As parties are partially benevolent, they tend to choose the value of
1 that maximizes the income of their own natural constituency. However, as they are partially
selsh, they also take into account the e¤ect of 1 on their probability of winning the elections
38We recall that, in the baseline model, higher political rents have either no e¤ect on the choice of 1, and
therefore on social welfare, if the Right is in o¢ ce, or they are potentially welfare-reducing when the Left is in
power since they make entrenchment more valuable.
36
in the following period. In particular, from (17) follows that the e¤ect of 1 on the probability
of the Right of winning the elections at time 1 is
@R1 (1)
@1
= (1(1))
0
1 (1); (38)
which has the same sign of 01 (1). By di¤erentiating equation (16) with respect to 1, we
obtain that
01 (1) = (1  )^ (ap   ar)
f(zP )  f(zR)
(1  )f(zP ) + f(zR) ; (39)
where zP and zR are dened as in Lemma 2 and where 
p
1(1; ) and 
r
1(1; ) in (36) and
(37) replace p1(1) and 
r
1(1). From (39) it is immediate that the sign of 
0
1 (1) is the same
as of (ap   ar). Therefore, if ap   ar > 0, then 01 (1) > 0, and higher levels of 1 increase
the probability of the Right of winning the elections at time 1, and vice versa.39
The optimal level of 1 for the Right can be derived from the value of party R at t = 1
V R1 (1; ) = (1 + 1)a
r +(1(1)) + [1  (1(1))]r1(1; );
which implies that
@V R1 (1; )
@1
= ar + [1  (1(1))] ^ (1  ) ap + (1(1))01 (1) [  r1(1; )] : (40)
Finally notice that the expressions in (23) and (24) to determine the optimal level of 1 for
the Left are still valid with the caveat that the net transfer is now given by (36).
7.1 Case 1a.  > ap=ar
In this case, a higher level of  also increases the income of the high-skill individuals, so
increasing aggregate output. Therefore, both parties should choose 1 = 1 to maximize the
income of their own constituencies. However, from 01 (1) < 0 (as ap ar < 0) it follows that
the Right can increase the probability of winning the elections at time 1 by choosing values
of 1 lower than 1. In other words, the entrenchment strategy may be optimal for the Right,
while the Left will now choose the e¢ cient level of 1 = 1 as this also maximizes its probability
of winning future elections.
In particular, as the rst two components of (40) are positive, r1(1; ) < 0, 
0
1 (1) < 0,
and 1(1) is independent on , then @V R1 (1; )=@1 is linearly increasing in  and positive
at  = 0. This means that V R1 (1; ) is monotonically increasing in 1 for all 1 2 [L; 1] if 
is lower than a certain threshold ^. This implies that there is no entrenchment by the Right,
39The opposite result holds for the probability of the Left (18) of winning the elections at time t = 1.
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which will choose 1 = 1, when the rents from o¢ ce are relatively low. However, there exists
a level of rents, , such that @V R1 (1; )=@1 < 0 for all 1 2 [L; 1] when   . This means
that V R1 (1; ) is monotonically decreasing in 1 and party R will choose 
R
1 = 
L. In other
words, high levels of rents may lead the Right to choose the entrenchment strategy, i.e., lower
values of  in order to increase its probability of winning future elections at the expense of its
constituency. The entrenchment strategy may also be optimal for intermediate values of . In
this case, the third term in (40) is negative but not too high, and the optimal value of 1 for
party R could be interior, i.e., R1 2 (L; 1). Finally notice that the negative e¤ect of  on R1
can also be shown from the fact that
@2V R1 (1; )
@1@
= (1(1))
0
1 (1) < 0; (41)
meaning that the objective function of the Right is submodular in 1 and , and therefore that
@R1 =@  0.
7.2 Case 1b. 0 <  < ap=ar
Again, as  > 0, higher levels of  increase the income of the high-skill citizens and aggregate
output, so that 1 = 1 maximizes the income of both constituencies. However, as ap ar > 0,
then 01 (1) > 0 and the situation is similar to the baseline model when only the Left has the
incentive to choose ine¢ cient values of 1 in order to increase its electoral advantage in the
following period.
7.3 Case 2.  < 0
When  is negative, 1 = L is the level that maximizes the income of the high-skill individuals.
Moreover,  < 0 implies that ap ar > 0 and 01 (1) > 0, so that the probability of the Right
of winning the elections at time 1, R1 (1), is increasing in 1 (see (38)). This means that the
Right may have the incentive to choose high levels of 1, and in the limit case 1 = 1, even
though this reduces the income of the rich. The expression in (40) contains both positive and
negative components. However, when the rents from o¢ ce  are su¢ ciently high, the third
term in (40) is likely to be so high and positive that @V R1 (1; )=@1 > 0 for all 1 2

L; 1

.
This means that V R1 (1; ) is monotonically increasing in 1 and the Right will nd optimal the
entrenchment strategy by choosing R1 = 1. In this respect, it useful to observe that V
R
1 (1; )
is supermodular in 1 and  as from (41) follows that @2V R1 (1; )=@1@ > 0, since 
0
1 (1) > 0,
and therefore that R1 is nondecreasing in  (i.e., @
R
1 =@  0). This is another case where
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Right has the incentive to entrench itself by choosing a policy that maximizes its benets at
the expense of its constituency.
As in the baseline model, 1 = 1 is the level of  that maximizes the income of the low-skill
producers and the Left has still the incentive to choose low levels of  as this increases its
chances of winning future elections and getting o¢ ce rents.
Finally notice that we can distinguish two cases when  < 0, depending on whether a fall in
1 raises or lower aggregate output. Hence, when  (1 )ap=ar <  < 0 (Case 2a in Corollary
2), a reduction of 1 raises the productivity of the rich but it is socially ine¢ cient. Therefore,
a selshright-wing party that cares mainly of o¢ ce rents (i.e., when  is large) may choose
for electoral reasons a high level of 1 that harms its own constituency but, nonetheless, it
pursues the e¢ cient policy. Conversely, when  <  (1  )ap=ar (Case 2b in Corollary 2), a
fall in 1 leads to aggregate productivity gains. In this case, the entrenchment by the Right,
i.e. high levels of 1, is socially ine¢ cient, while the entrenchment by the Left, which chooses
low values of 1 is socially e¢ cient. In other words, we obtain the somewhat paradoxical result
that greater political rents may now be potentially welfare improving, in the sense that they
induce the Left to entrench itself more and raise aggregate output. This case is particularly
interesting because a reduction of 1 corresponds to those policies that benet the rich, increase
aggregate output, but have a direct negative e¤ect on the income of the unskilled, such as a
trade liberalization in a capital-rich economy or liberal immigration policies.
The following lemma summarizes the main results of this section.
Lemma 8 If the level of rents from o¢ ce  is su¢ ciently high, then party R may choose
the entrenchment strategy when  > ap=ar or  < 0. In the former case, the income of the
rich is maximized at 1 = 1, the Right chooses R1 < 1 and entrenchment always produces
aggregate productivity losses. In the latter case, the income of the rich is maximized at 1 =
L, the Right chooses R1 > 
L and entrenchment produces aggregate productivity gains when
 (1   )ap=ar <  < 0. When  <  (1   )ap=ar, the entrenchment strategy by the Left,
which chooses P1 < 1 is socially e¢ cient.
8 The Importance of the Theory for Term Limits
According to the standard models of Barro (1973) and Ferejohn (1986) elections allow the
citizens to (partially) solve the potential moral hazard problem of incumbent politicians, who
can be induced not to appropriate for themselves too much resources by the implicit threat of
non being reelected in the future. Persson, Roland and Tabellini (1997) reach essentially the
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same conclusion in a model featuring a richer description of political institutions.
In these frameworks, a term limit is unambiguously welfare reducing since it forces voters
not to reappoint a politician in o¢ ce regardless on its performance. Therefore, under a term
limit elections lose part of their e¢ cacy as discipline device, which implies that the implicit
contract o¤ered by the voters to incumbent politicians must allow the latter to appropriate
greater rents. This result raises the natural question of why many real world constitutions
prescribe term limits for elections held either at the national or at the local level.
In this Section, we take a rst step toward addressing this puzzle, by extending the baseline
model assuming the existence of a constitutionally legislated term limit, which prevents an
individual politician, but not its own party, in o¢ ce in the rst period to compete for o¢ ce in
the second period. The main result is that a term limit may be benecial for society (i.e., the
sum of rich and poor citizens) as it reduces the scope for political entrenchment.40
Let us now assume that the politicians initially in power are partially altruistic toward
their own party, in the sense that their utility in the second period of the game (where they are
never in o¢ ce due to the presence of a term limit) is equal to a fraction  2 [0; 1] of the rents
 potentially appropriated by their party at that point. The parameter  can be interpreted in
a variety of ways. For example, it can reect a genuine concern of the politicians for its own
party. Alternatively,  may capture the degree of party discipline,dened as the capacity of
a party to align the preferences (and decisions) of its members in o¢ ce to its own preferences
(see Grossman and Helpman, 2008). More generally, this assumption is in the spirit of the
observation (e.g., Alesina and Spear, 1988) that political parties are more durable, and have
longer horizons, than politicians.
Formally, the lifetime preferences of a politician from party J 2 fP;Rg under term limits
can be represented as follows
vJ;TL0 = E0
1X
t=0
tvJ;TLt ;
with
vJ;TLt = (1   t) ajt +Gt + (t (  1) + 1) t;
for t 2 f0; 1g.
The analysis of the equilibrium in presence of terms limits is straightforward since the
40We do not provide here a complete positive theory of term limits (which is beyond the purpose of this paper)
since in our framework term limits will have only benecial e¤ects for society (i.e., they reduce the scope for
entrenchment at zero cost). A general positive theory of term limits should incorporate both the benets (such
as those we emphasize) and the costs (such as those emphasized by the models of Barro, 1973, and of Ferejohn,
1986), and explain how the corresponding trade-o¤ is resolved.
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objective function of party J at time t = 0 is the same as in the baseline model, while it contains
the term  rather than  at time t = 1. Therefore, the structure of the equilibrium and its
comparative statics properties are essentially the same as before. In particular, the objective
function of party P at time t = 1 is submodular in ; by standard monotone comparative statics
results this implies that, conditionally on the presence of term limits, greater party discipline
(i.e., higher ) leads to a (weakly) higher entrenchment as it induces the politicians to act more
in line with the preferences of their own party. In the limit case of  = 1, party discipline is
so strong that the politician in o¢ ce at period t = 0 behaves as perfect agent of its own party,
maximizing the partys continuation value, and choosing the same value of 1 that it would
choose in absence of term limits (in this case, term limits are irrelevant). In the polar case of
 = 0, conversely, a term limit is maximally e¤ective since it induces a left-wing politician to
act as perfect agent of its own constituency, as in the case were there are no political rents
( = 0), and therefore to set P1 = 1.
We conclude this section by observing that term limits themselves are not necessary a
panacea to political moral hazard problems, as the extent to which term limits actually reduce
the incentives of incumbent politicians to implement policies of entrenchment depends critically
on the degree of party discipline.
9 Conclusions
This paper has posed a simple but, to the best of our knowledge, novel question: why do
politicians occasionally implement policies damaging the economic interests of the same people
that brought them in power?
To address this question, we have proposed a simple dynamic model of voting with redis-
tributive scal policy in a two-parties system. The Left party alone can credibly be expected
to provide some redistribution in favor of the lower classes, but the economic gain of voting for
it may be outweighed by the emergence of a strong ideological bias in favor of the Right in the
future. We have found that policies that reduce the income of the poor relative to the average
income, such as failing to upgrade the skills of the workers and preventing their erosion by
new, skill-biased, technologies, paradoxically consolidates the political power of the Left. This
is because these policies make the natural constituency of a left-wing party endogenously more
dependent on it and, therefore, increase the support for the party itself. An equilibrium with
entrenchment features relative economic stagnation and, in particular, falling unskilled wages,
higher inequality, and persistence of the power of the Left. Such an equilibrium is not based on
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any form of myopia or irrationality of politicians or voters and is more likely to emerge, inter
alia, when the political rents appropriated by the incumbent leaders are relatively high, which
is the case for example in weakly-institutionalized polities (or in presidential governments with
limited checks and balances).
Our comparative statics analysis has claried how some features, such as state capacity,
the bias in favor of a party and income inequality a¤ect the incentive of parties to pursue
entrenchment policies. We have discussed the case where the left-wing party may have the
incentive to ex-ante commit to not pursue entrenchment policies once in power. And we have
shown that, in a more general framework, also the right-wing party may adopt policies dam-
aging its own constituency in order to increase its electoral advantage and that entrenchment
policies are not necessarily ine¢ cient from a social perspective. Moreover, it is important to
remark that the scope for political entrenchment is much wider than the one suggested by our
simple model focusing only on the politics of pure income redistribution and can be applied to
other scenarios, involving the provision of public goods such as, for example, national defence.
An interesting application of the theory in the area of the positive analysis of institutional
design is the rationale for the existence of term limits in democratic constitutions. Our analysis
suggests that term limits are potentially benecial for society to the extent that they reduce
the incentives of incumbent politicians in promoting socially ine¢ cient entrenchment policies
by reducing their political time-horizon. Nevertheless, the benets from term limits may be
related to other features of the political system, such as the degree of party discipline. The
endogenous determination of the politics of entrenchment, party discipline and term limits in
a dynamic political setup seems to be a potentially interesting topic for future research.
10 Appendix
10.1 The E¤ect of Income Inequality
In this appendix, we analyze the e¤ect of income inequality on entrenchment. We rewrite
ar =


a and ap =
1  
1  a; (42)
with  2 (; 1) representing an index of income inequality and a the average income.
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Using (24), we obtain that
@2V P1 (1;)
@1@
=   a
1   [1  (1  (

1(1)))^] (43)
 (1(1))01 (1)

1 + ^

a

+
1a
1  

+ (1(1))
@1(1)
@
^ap
 0(1(1))
@1(1)
@
01 (1) [ +
p
1(1)]  (1(1))
@01 (1)
@
[ +p1(1)] :
From the implicit di¤erentiation of (16) with respect to  and (42) we have that
@1(1)
@
=  ^(1  )

a

+
1a
1  

f(zP )  f(zR)
(1  )f(zP ) + f(zR) < 0;
and the derivative of 01 (1) in (21) with respect to  leads to
@01 (1)
@
=  ^a f(zP )  f(zR)
(1  )f(zP ) + f(zR)
 (1  )^2ap

a

+
1a
1  

[f(zR)f
0(zP )  (1  ) f(zP )f 0(zR)]
[(1  )f(zP ) + f(zR)]2
 (1  )^ ap@

1(1)
@
f(zR)f
0(zP )  f(zP )f 0(zR)
[(1  )f(zP ) + f(zR)]2
;
whose sign is generally ambiguous as the rst term is negative and the other two are positive.
From (43) follows that the e¤ect of higher income inequality on entrenchment is ambiguous
and it is very similar to the e¤ect of state capacity. In fact, the rst three terms in (43)
are negative and they represent the appropriation e¤ect generated by higher inequality; these
components push towards a reduction of 1 as income inequality increases (@

1=@  0). The
last two terms are the marginal political return e¤ect from higher inequality. The fourth term
is positive and comes from the fact that an increase in  makes the Left more popular, so
reducing the mass of citizens at the margin; this reduces the scope for entrenchment and leads
to a higher 1 (@

1=@  0). The nal term has a similar interpretation and will generally
be ambiguous since this is case for @01 (1)=@. As the appropriation e¤ect and the marginal
political return e¤ect may have opposite sign, the total e¤ect of income inequality on 1 will
generally be ambiguous.
10.2 Proof of Lemma 7
We rst show that @0(
L)=@L < 0 when state capacity is su¢ ciently small. From the implicit
di¤erentiation of equation (30) dening 0(0; 
L) when 1 = 
L, we obtain
@0(
L)
@L
=  (1  )f(z^P )(@
p
0(0; 
L)=@L) + f(z^R)(@
r
0(0; 
L)=@L)
(1  )f(z^P ) + f(z^R) ;
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where z^P   p0(0; L)   0(0; L) and z^R   r0(0; L)   0(0; L). The di¤erentiation
of p0(0; 
L) and r0(0; 
L), dened respectively in (27) and (28), with respect to L leads to
@p0(0; 
L)
@L
= 
@Up1 (
L)
@L
= 

ap   1  (1(L)) ^ap   (1(L))01 (L)p1(L)	 ;
and
@r0(0; 
L)
@L
= 
@U r1 (
L)
@L
= 

1  (1(L))

(1  )^ ap + (1(L))01 (L)(1  )^(ar   1ap)
	
:
From Lemma 2 follows that 01 (
L) > 0 and, therefore, that @r0(0; 
L)=@L is always positive.
The sign of @p0(0; 
L)=@L is instead generally ambiguous. However, as ^ # 0, 01 (1) # 0,
and @p0(0; 
L)=@L > 0, which in turn implies that @0(
L)=@L < 0.
We now show that @V P0 (
L)=@L > 0 for all L 2 [0; 1] when ^ is small enough and  is
relatively high.
From (23), it follows that
V P1 (
L)  V P1 (1) = 1ap + [1  (1(1))]

 +p1(
L)
  ap   [1  (1(1))]  +p1(L) ;
and substituting this expression and (24) into (35), we obtain that
@V P0 (
L)=@L =

1  (0(L))

ap

1  1  (1(L)) ^	 (44)
  1  (0(L))(1(L))01 (L) [^(ar   1ap) + ]
 (0(L))
@0(
L)
@L


1  (1(L))
 
 +p1(
L)
  [1  (1(1))] [ +p1(1)]	
 (0(L))
@0(
L)
@L

   (1  L)ap :
The rst and second term of (44) are respectively positive and negative since 01 (
L) > 0.
@0(
L)=@L < 0 ensures that the third term is positive; in fact, from L < 1 follows that
p1(
L) > p1(1), and 
0
1 (
L) > 0 implies that 1(
L) < 1(1) and that (1(
L)) < (1(1)).
The fourth term has an ambiguous sign depending on the level of the rents from o¢ ce; however,
this term is positive when the rents are su¢ ciently high, i.e.  > ~  ap.
As ^ # 0, 01 (1) # 0, and the second term of (44) tends to zero. If  >   maxf; ~g,
then @V P0 (
L)=@L is positive for all L 2 [0; 1].41 This means that the ex-ante welfare of the
Left is globally strictly increasing in L and, therefore, it is maximized at L = 1. This result
completes the proof of the Lemma.
41We remind that  guarantees that V P1 (1; ) is everywhere decreasing in 1 for any  > 
 (see Remark 2)
so that 1 = 
L.
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